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Abstract
We propose in this paper the Security Policy Language (SePL), which is a formal language for
capturing and integrating distributed security policies. The syntax of SePL includes several opera-
tors for the integration of policies and it is endowed with a denotational semantics that is a generic
semantics, i.e., which is independent of any evaluation environment. We prove the completeness
of SePL with respect to sets theory. Furthermore, we provide a formalization of a subset of the eX-
tensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML), which is the well-known standard informal
specification language of Web security policies. We provide also a semantics for XACML policy
combining algorithms.
Keywords: Security Policies; Formal Languages; Semantics; Integration; XACML.
1. Introduction
Nowadays, there is a drastic growing of security threats, which benefit from security breaches
in systems to jeopardize their security and achieve malicious goals such as thief and illegal access to
information, identity masquerading, etc. The consequences of security attacks can be fatal to insti-
tutions and companies, which made security a major concern for people in industry and academia.
In this context, building secure systems is becoming a paramount challenge mainly in a distributed
environment where each system has its own security policies, which may conflict with policies of
other systems. In such environment, security policies specification is based on standard languages,
which are often informal and complex such as the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML) [27]; the well-known standard informal specification language of Web security policies.
Such complexity makes the learning curve of the proposed languages very high and increases the
likelihood of having design errors. Accordingly, there is a desideratum for providing simple and
formal models that capture such policies and allow to reason about them.
There are two main classes of approaches for formalizing security policies: Model and lan-
guage based methods. Model based approaches leverage formalisms such as transition systems
to capture policies. Model checking of system compliance to security properties is one of the
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main targets behind the design of such models. The main issue with such methods is their limited
scalability when applied to huge policies.
Regarding language based approaches, several languages were proposed to specify security
policies. XML-based specification languages use XML tags to describe security policies and rules
between subjects and resources. Famous XML-based specification languages include Security
Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [20], XML Access Control Policy Specification Language
(XACL) [8], and Extensible Access Markup Control Language (XACML) [27]. The issue with
such languages is that they are machine readable and so difficult to be understood. Furthermore,
they lack the formal aspect that allows reasoning about them. Declarative languages provide a high
level of simplicity and readability for the specification of security policies. We mention Ponder
[9] as a famous declarative, object-oriented language for specifying policies for the security and
management of distributed systems. The main issue with such languages is the lack of abstractness
that allows to reason about correctness and completeness issues. Event based languages, such
as Policy Description Language (PDL) [7] and DEFCon Policy Language (DPL) [21], leverage
events and actions to model security policies and rules between subjects and resources. Some of
these languages put more focus on actions rather than data while others express constraints on event
flows. The main issue with such languages is their complexity and sometimes their modeling of low
level details. Algebraic languages allow to formally define security policies. An important feature
of algebraic security policy languages is their simplicity, powerful expressiveness and compactness.
We advocate in this work the need for a simple, formal, precise and rigorous language to guar-
antee the absence of inconsistencies in policies, reason about their integration, and prove their
correctness. To achieve this goal, we define in this paper a new language called Security Pol-
icy Language (SePL) for the specification of distributed security policies. We also show how the
language can be leveraged to define the integration of policies. In addition, we present a formal-
ization of a large subset of the latest version of XACML based on SePL, which provides a simple
understanding of that language. The contributions of this paper are three-folds:
• The proposal of a new formal Security Policy Language (SePL) for the specification and
integration of security policies.
• The elaboration of a generic denotational semantics for SePL that is capable of expressing
complex security policies.
• The formalization of almost all XACML policy combining algorithms based on SePL and
the proof of the completeness of SePL with respect to set theory.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to the presentation of the syntax
and semantics of SePL. We provide a formalization of XACML based on SePL in Section 3. We
provide in Section 5 a minimal version of SePL. Section 4 is devoted to the proof of completeness
of SePL. In section 6, we provide a comparison of our work with the related work. Finally, we
provide some concluding remarks in Section 7.
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2. Security Policy Language: Syntax and Semantics
We present in this section the syntax and semantics of the Security Policy Language (SePL).
We use some of the abbreviations and notations that we exhibit in the following. Let A =<
a1, . . . , an > be a list of attributes such that the domain of ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is denoted by D(ai).
Let ϕ1 = (d11, . . . , d
1
n) and ϕ2 = (d
2
1, . . . , d
2
n) such that d
1
i ⊆ D(ai) and d2i ⊆ D(ai), for all
i in {1, . . . , n}. We assume also that a set d can be defined either by explicitly giving its ele-
ments (e.g {v1 . . . , vm}) or by a predicate (e.g {x : D(a) | x 6= v}). We assume that > denotes
(D(a1), . . . ,D(an)) and ⊥ denotes (∅, . . . , ∅). We assume also that the value of an attribute can
stay unknown: for example a1 = x where x is variable in D(a1). If the name of the variable is
not important, we simply write a1 =?. When there is no ambiguity, ? is also used to abbreviate
(?, . . . , ?) which is a tuple where all its attributes have unknown values, i.e., (x1, . . . , xn).
2.1. Syntax
The syntax of SePL is given by the following BNF grammar:
P,P1,P2 ::= ε | 0 | 1 | R | ¬P | pP | P1 · P2
| P1TP2 | P1UP2 | P1 ‖ P2
| P1 + P2 | P1 − P2 | P1 	 P2
R ::= < ϕ1, ϕ2 >
where
• ε denotes the empty policy.
• 0 denotes the policy that denies all actions.
• 1 denotes the policy that accepts all actions.
• R =< ϕ1, ϕ2 > denotes the policy that accepts actions accepted by ϕ1 and not denied by ϕ2
and denies actions denied by ϕ2 and not accepted by ϕ1.
• ¬P denotes the policy that accepts actions that P denies and denies actions that P accepts.
• pP behaves like P except that it transforms the indeterminate part of P to not applicable. In
other words, if the accept part or the deny part of P is indeterminate, it becomes an empty
set.
• P1 · P2 denotes the sequential composition of policies. This gives the result of the first one
applicable. If no one is applicable, the result is either not applicable or indeterminate if P1
and P2 are indeterminate.
• P1TP2 denotes the policy that gives priority to accept, i.e, it accepts an action when P1 or P2
accepts it and denies an action when no one of them accepts it and at least one of them denies
it. Otherwise, the policy is either not applicable or indeterminate if P1 or P2 is indeterminate.
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• P1UP2: This is the dual part of T since it gives priority to deny. It denies an action when
P1 or P2 denies it and accepts an action when no one of them denies it and at least one of
them accepts it. Otherwise, the policy is either not applicable or indeterminate if P1 or P2 is
indeterminate.
• P1 ‖ P2 denotes the parallel composition of policies. It accepts an action when both of them
accept and denies when both of them deny. Otherwise, the policy is either not applicable or
indeterminate if P1 or P2 is indeterminate.
• P1 +P2 denotes the choice between two policies. It accepts when one of them accept and no
one denies, and denies when one of them denies and no one accepts. Otherwise, the policy
is either not applicable or indeterminate if P1 or P2 is indeterminate.
• P1−P2 denotes the policy that accepts when P1 accepts and P2 is not applicable and denies
when P1 denies and P2 is not applicable. Otherwise, the policy is either not applicable or
indeterminate if P1 or P2 is indeterminate.
• P1 	 P2. This behaves like P1 − P2 except that the result is indeterminate (“?”) when there
is an overlap between P1 and P2 (i.e. the accepts of P1 together with its denies is not disjoint
from the accepts of P2 added to its denies) .
To reduce the number of parentheses when writing properties, we assume the following prece-
dence between operators (from strong to weak) ¬, p, ., ||,T,U, +. For example P1 + ¬P2.P3||P4
is same as P1 + (((¬P2).P3)||P4). Notice that SePL does not explicitly contain the composition
rules (combining algorithms) used in XACML, but, as we show later that, it is expressive enough to
specify them. Also, the operators of SePL are not independent from each others. We show later that
we can remove many of them without affecting the expressiveness of the language. In fact, we can
keep only the operators belonging to the set {¬, p, ‖,+,	} without affecting the expressiveness of
the language.
2.2. Semantics
• Preliminary definitions: Let A = (α1, . . . , αn) and B = (β1, . . . , βn) be two tuples of n
set elements. In the sequel, we define the following semantic operators:
A ∪B = (α1 ∪ β1, . . . , αn ∪ βn)
A ∩B = (α1 ∩ β1, . . . , αn ∩ βn)
A−B = (α1 − β1, . . . , αn − βn)
A	B = (α1 	 β1, . . . , αn 	 βn)
Aq = (α1q, . . . , αnq)
pA = (pα1, . . . ,pαn)
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where
α	 β = α− ((α ∩ β)∩?)
= α ∩ ((α ∩ β)∩?)
=
{
α if α ∩ β = ∅
? otherwise
pα =
{
α if α 6=?
∅ otherwise
αq =
{
α if α 6=?
D(α) otherwise
p(α ∪ β) = pα ∪ pβ
p(α ∩ β) = pα ∩ pβ
p(α) = αq
(α ∪ β)q = αq ∪ βq
(α ∩ β)q = αq ∩ βq
(α)q = pα
• Absolute Semantics ([[ − ]]): The absolute semantics of a policy P , denoted by [[ P ]]
returns a pair (A,B) where A is the acceptance domain of P and B is its denying domain.
The domain that is not explicitly accepted or denied by a policy defines implicitly its “non-
applicable” domain. More formally, [[ − ]] is inductively defined as shown by Table 1 where
(A1, D1) denotes the semantics of P1, (A2, D2) denotes the semantics of P2 and (A,D)
denotes the semantics of P .
The absolute semantics gives the meaning of a policy independent from the environment in
which it will be evaluated. One of the advantages of this semantics is that any optimization or
simplification applied to it can be used for any environment. This means that we can reduce
the time of the evaluation of the semantics by optimizing this semantics one time and use it
many times with different environments. Another advantage is that it allows to prove some
general results independent from a specific environment.
• Relative Semantics ([[ − ]]Γ): The semantics of a policy P relative to an environment
Γ, denoted by [[ P ]]Γ, returns the decision of the policy P regarding Γ. In practice, the
environment Γ contains both the action that we want to execute together with its context (the
values of the variables of the environment during its execution). For our semantics, the result
is (α, β) where {α, β} ⊂ {T, ?,F} (T stands for True, F stands for False, and ? stands for
unknown). Usually, the result is considered as permit if α = T, deny if β = T, otherwise
the result is either not applicable or indeterminate. It is non applicable if α = β = F and it
is indeterminate if α and β are in {(F, ?), (?,F), (?, ?)}. More details about these notations
will be given within the section regarding the formalization of the XACML language.
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Table 1: Absolute Semantics
[[ < ϕ1, ϕ2 > ]] = (ϕ1 − ϕ2, ϕ2 − ϕ1)
[[ ε ]] = (⊥,⊥)
[[ 0 ]] = (⊥,>)
[[ 1 ]] = (>,⊥)
[[ ¬P ]] = (D,A)
[[ pP ]] = (pA, pD)
[[ P1 · P2 ]] = (A1 ∪ (A2 −D1), D1 ∪ (D2 −A1))
[[ P1TP2 ]] = (A1 ∪A2, (D1 −A2) ∪ (D2 −A1))
[[ P1UP2 ]] = (A1 −D2 ∪A2 −D1, D1 ∪D2)
[[ P1 ‖ P2 ]] = (A1 ∩A2, D1 ∩D2)
[[ P1 + P2 ]] = ((A1 ∪A2)− (D1 ∪D2), (D1 ∪D2)− (A1 ∪A2))
[[ P1 − P2 ]] = (A1 − (A2 ∪D2), D1 − (A2 ∪D2))
[[ P1 	 P2 ]] = (A1 	 (A2 ∪D2), D1 	 (A2 ∪D2))
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More formally, let Γ = [a1 = v1, . . . , an = vn] be an environment where vi ∈ D(ai) ∪ {?}
and “a =?” means that the value of the attribute a is unknown. Let P be a policy such that
[[ P ]] = (A,D). We extend the definition of [[ − ]], as follows:
[[ P ]]Γ = ([[ A ]]Γ, [[ D ]]Γ)
[[ (d1, . . . , dn) ]]Γ = [[ d1 ]]Γ(a1) ∧ . . . ∧ [[ dn ]]Γ(an)
[[ d ]]Γ(a) =

T if Γ(a) ∈ d or d = D(a)
F if Γ(a) 6∈ d or d = ∅
? otherwise
Notice that the truth tables of the three-valued logic is as shown hereafter:
∧ T ? F
T T ? F
? ? ? F
F F F F
∨ T ? F
T T T T
? T ? ?
F T ? F
	 T ? F
T ? ? T
? ? ? ?
F F F F
b ¬b
T F
? ?
F T
b pb
T T
? F
F F
It is sometimes useful to define [[ − ]]Γ in a compositional way as shown in Table 2 where
(a1, d1) denotes [[ P1 ]]Γ, (a2, d2) denotes [[ P1 ]]Γ and (a, d) denotes [[ P ]]Γ:
where a− b denotes a ∧ ¬b
2.3. Three-Valued Logic: choices and consequences
The first famous three-valued logic has been proposed by Lukasiewicz in [1] since 1920. A
formula can be evaluated to true (T), false (F) or undecided (?). This third value makes the logic
complicated and we need to make some choices about the evaluation of the combination of formula
using classical boolean operator. For example, the result of “?∨¬?” is it true? the result of “?∧¬?”
is it true? is x → y is equal to x ∨ ¬y?. Beside the logic proposed by Lukasiewicz, many others
were proposed to reflect these different choices. The Kleene three-valued logic [2] and the Fitting
logic [5] are the most famous. Within the Lukasiewicz, Kleene and Fitting logics, we have the
following properties:
• Idempotency (x ∨ x ≡ x and x ∧ x ≡ x);
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Table 2: Relative Semantics
[[ < ϕ1, ϕ2 > ]]Γ = ([[ ϕ1 − ϕ2 ]]Γ, [[ ϕ2 − ϕ1 ]]Γ)
[[ ε ]] = (F,F)
[[ 0 ]]Γ = (F,T)
[[ 1 ]]Γ = (T,F)
[[ ¬P ]]Γ = (d, a)
[[ pP ]]Γ = (
pa, pd)
[[ P1 · P2 ]]Γ = (a1 ∨ (a2 − d1), d1 ∨ (d2 − a1))
[[ P1TP2 ]]Γ = (a1 ∨ a2, (d1 − a2) ∨ (d2 − a1))
[[ P1UP2 ]]Γ = (a1 − d2 ∨ a2 − d1, d1 ∨ d2)
[[ P1 ‖ P2 ]]Γ = (a1 ∧ a2, d1 ∧ d2)
[[ P1 + P2 ]]Γ = ((a1 ∨ a2)− (d1 ∨ d2), (d1 ∨ d2)− (a1 ∨ a2))
[[ P1 − P2 ]]Γ = (a1 − (a2 ∨ d2), d1 − (a2 ∨ d2))
[[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ = (a1 	 (a2 ∨ d2), d1 	 (a2 ∨ d2))
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• Commutativity (x ∨ y ≡ y ∨ x and x ∧ y ≡ y ∧ x);
• Associativity ((x ∨ y) ∨ z ≡ x ∨ (y ∨ z) and (x ∧ y) ∧ z ≡ x ∧ (y ∧ z));
• Absorption ((x ∧ y) ∨ x ≡ x and (x ∨ y) ∧ x ≡ x);
• Distributivity ((x ∧ y) ∨ z ≡ (x ∧ z) ∨ (y ∧ z) and (x ∨ y) ∧ z ≡ (x ∨ z) ∧ (y ∨ z));
• Double Negation (¬¬x ≡ x);
• De Morgan (¬(x ∨ y) ≡ ¬x ∧ ¬y and ¬(x ∧ y) ≡ ¬x ∨ ¬y);
• Contraposition (x→ y ≡ ¬y → ¬x).
Lukasiewicz and Kleene logic have the Equivalence (x ↔ y ≡ (x → y) ∧ (y → ¬x)) but
not the Fitting one. The Kleene and Fitting logic have the Syllogism ((x ↔ y) ∧ (y → z) ≡
(x → z)) but not the Lukasiewicz one. None of the the previous logics has the Excluded Middle
((x ∨ ¬x) ≡ T ) or the Contradiction ((x ∧ ¬x) ≡ F ). For our semantics, we adopt the following
convention: The value “?” is used to represent a formula that can neither be evaluated to true (T)
nor to false (F) due to some missing values for a part of its variables. For example, x ∧ y can be
considered as ? if the values of x and y are unknown. However, x ∧ (¬x ∧ y) will be evaluated
to F even x and y are unknown since x ∧ (¬x ∧ y) ≡ (x ∧ ¬x) ∧ y) ≡ F ∧ x ≡ F . Notice
that the problem of knowing whether a formula is valid or not is decidable. A symbol “?” can be
substituted by a fresh variable in a formula.
3. Formalizing XACML Policies based on SePL
We show in this section how we can leverage SePL to formalize XACML policies.
3.1. Overview of XACML
XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) [27] is a set of XML schemas that
define the specifications of a language for access control policies. As shown in Figure 3.1, a
XACML policy is composed of a target, an obligation and a set of rules. Rules are also composed
of target conditions and effects or permissions.
Because a policy may contain multiple rules with different decisions, we need to clarify how
to build the decision of a policy from the decision of its rules. To this end, we formalized the
“Rules Combining Algorithm” that was proposed for this purpose by OASIS. It is also possible to
aggregate policies to form a “PolicySet”. A Policyset has also a target that limits the scope of its
applicability and an algorithm that defines its global decision from the local decisions returned by
its policies. The target of an access request is first compared to the target of a Policyset, if they
are different this Policyset is not applicable. Otherwise, the target of the request is compared to
the targets of policies inside the Policyset. A policy is qualified as not applicable when its target is
different from the target of the request. When a policy and a request agree on the target, the request
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Figure 3.1: XACML structure
is analyzed by the rules inside the policy: A rule is applicable if its targets include the target of the
request and its condition is evaluated to true.
The XACML standard describes four types of Combining Algorithms. Hereafter, we describe
how a PolicySet combines the results of its policies. The same algorithms can be used to combine
the decisions of rules to build the decision of their policies.
• Permit-overrides: A PolicySet accepts if at least one of its policies accepts and denies if no
one of its policies accepts and at least one denies. Otherwise, the PolicySet is not applicable.
• Deny-overrides: It returns “deny” if at least one policy denies and it returns “accept” if no
policy denies and at least one policy accepts. Otherwise, the policy is not applicable.
• First Applicable: It accepts if there is at least one policy that accepts and this policy is not
proceeded by a denying one and vise-versa.
• Only-one-applicable: if more than one policy is applicable, then the result is indeterminate.
Otherwise, the result of the unique applicable policy will be considered.
3.2. Abbreviations
For the sake of making the presentation clear, we adopt the following abbreviations:
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• We use the terms N/A, Permit, Deny, Indeterminate(P), Indeterminate(D), Indetermi-
nate(PD) as an abbreviation of the following situations:
N/A = (F,F)
Permit = (T,F) or (T, ?)
Deny = (F,T) or (?,T)
Indeterminate(P) = (?,F)
Indeterminate(D) = (F, ?)
Indeterminate(PD) = (?, ?)
• We denote by ϕ→ p and ϕ→ d the following policies:
ϕ→ p ≡ (ϕ,⊥)
ϕ→ d ≡ (⊥, ϕ)
• Any ϕ = (d1, . . . , dn) can be represented by its restricted attributes only. An attribute ai
is restricted in ϕ if di 6= D(ai). For example, if A =< Role,Object,Action > such that
D(Role) = {r1, r2, r3}, D(Object) = {o1, o2, o3, o4} and D(Action) = {a1, a2}, then we
can use the following abbreviation:
(1)
({r1, r2, r3}, {o1}, {a2})
≡
(Object ∈ {o1},Action ∈ {a2})
≡
(Object = o1,Action = a2)
(2)
({r1, r2, r3}, {o1}, {a1, a2})
≡
(Object ∈ {o1})
≡
(Object = o1)
• If op is a binary SePL operator, we denote by op(P1, P2) the prefix notation of P1 op P2.
For example, P1TP2 can be denoted by T(P1, P2). The result can be generalized to n com-
positions since all the operators of SePL are transitive. For example, P1TP2T. . . TPn can be
represented by T(P1, P2, . . . , Pn).
• The policy φ : P is the abbreviation defined inductively as follows:
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φ : (φ1, φ2) = (φ ∩ φ1, φ ∩ φ2)
φ : ¬P = ¬(φ : P )
φ :pP = p(φ : P )
φ : (P1 ‖ P2) = (φ : P1) ‖ (φ : P2)
φ : (P1 + P2) = (φ : P1) + (φ : P2)
φ : (P1 	 P2) = (φ : P1)	 (φ : P2)
Also, we update the precedence between operators (from strong to weak) “:”, “¬”, “p”, “.”,
“||”, “T”, “U”, “+”.
3.3. From XACML to SePL
Table 3.3 outlines a BNF grammar that we propose to capture a significant subset of XACML-
3.0. The literature does not contain such grammar and it is not simple to build it from XACML-3.0
specification. This will be useful also to automatically build a lexical analyzer and parser for
XACML-3.0 using tools such as Lex and Yacc [6].
The transformation function d − e from XACML to SePL can be inductively defined as shown
in Table 3.4. Its definition is based on our own understanding of the XACML-3.0 textual descrip-
tion. Each rule is dedicated to a specific component (PolicySet, Policy, Rules, etc.) of XACML-3.0,
where bold terms denote terminal words. For example, transforming an XACML condition (de-
scribed by ”< Condition > BooleanExpression < / Condition >”) to SePL turns to extract
the BooleanExpression and ignore the rest.
We have also developed, using PHP and XML, a web based application allowing to automati-
cally convert XACML security policies to SPL as shown by Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Automatic Conversion of XACML to SPL
3.4. Example
The XACML policy, given in Table 4, includes two rules and is extracted from [27]: the first
one provides the reading right of the file secret.txt to only Alice or Bob while the second rule
provides access for anyone to that file. The SePL term related to this XACML policy is as follows:
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Table 3: A BNF Grammar for a Subset of XACML-3.0
PDPpolicies ::= PolicySet | Policy
PolicySet ::= < POLICYSET Pheader > [Description] Targets Policies [Obligation] [Advice] </ POLICYSET >
Policy ::= < POLICY Rheader > [Description] Targets Rules [Obligation] [Advice] </ POLICY >
Policies ::= Policy | Policy Policies
Rules ::= < RULE Rheader > [Description] [Targets] [Condition] [Obligation] [Advice] </ RULE >
PSheader ::= PolicySetId = string Version = number PolicyCombiningAlgId = Palg
Pheader ::= PolicyeId = string Version = number RuleCombiningAlgId = Ralg
Rheader ::= RuleId = string Effect = REffect
Palg ::= only-one-applicable
| Ralg
Ralg ::= deny-overrides
| permit-overrides
| first-applicable
| ordered-permit-overrides
REffect ::= Permit | Deny
Targets ::= < TARGET > [MatchAny] < / TARGET >
MatchAny ::= < AnyOf > matchAll < / AnyOf >
|< AnyOf > matchAll < / AnyOf >MatchAny
MatchAll ::= < AllOf >Matches < / AnyOf >
|< AnyOf >Matches < / AllOf >MatchAll
Matches ::= Match |Match Matches
Match ::= < Match MatchID = MatchId >
< AttrValue > value < / AttrValue >
< AttributeDesignator ADHeader / >
< / Match >
MatchId ::= string-equal
| integer-equal
| string-regexp-match
| integer-greater-than
| . . .
ADHeader ::= Category= Subject AttributeId = AttSubject DataType= type MustBePresent= boolean
| Category= resource AttributeId = AttResource DataType= type MustBePresent= boolean
| Category= action AttributeId = AttAction DataType= type MustBePresent= boolean
| Category= environment AttributeId = AttEnv DataType= type MustBePresent= boolean
Subject ::= access-subject
| recipient-subject
| intermediary-subject
. . .
AttSubject ::= subject-id
| subject-id-qualifier
| key-info
| authentication-time
. . .
AttResource ::= resource-id
| target-namespace
AttAction ::= action-id
| implied-action
| action-namespace
AttEnv ::= current-time
| current-date
| current-dateTime
type ::= x500Name
| rfc822Name
| ipAddress
| dnsName
| xpathExpression
| string
| boolean
| double
| time
| date
| dateTime
| anyURI
| hexBinary
| base64Binary
Condition ::= < Condition > BooleanExpression < / Condition >
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P = φ : (P1.P2)
φ = string − equal(resource− id, secret.txt)
P1 = (string − equal(action− id, write)→ d
= (⊥, (string − equal(action− id, write))
P2 = (string − equal(subject− id, Alice)→ d
= (⊥, (string − equal(subject− id, Alice))
3.5. SePL formal semantics for XACML combining algorithms
We provide in this section a SePL-based semantics for XACML combining algorithms. The
proofs of the conformance of our semantics for each XACML combining algorithm and its
XACML specification are provided in the appendix.
3.5.1. Permit-override:
Permit-overrides between P1, . . . , Pn, denoted by POR(P1, . . . , Pn): It accepts if at least one
policy accepts and denies if no one accept and at least one denies. It can be formalized in SePL as
follows:
POR(P1, . . . , Pn) ≈ P1T. . . TPn
3.5.2. Deny-overrides:
Deny-overrides between P1, . . . , Pn, denoted by DOR(P1, . . . , Pn): It denies if at least one
policy denies and accepts if no one denies and at least one accepts. It can be formalized in SePL as
follows:
DOR(P1, . . . , Pn) ≈ P1U . . .UPn
3.5.3. First-Applicable:
First-Applicable between P1, . . . , Pn, denoted by FA(P1, . . . , Pn): It accepts if there is at
least one policy that accepts and that is not proceeded by a denying one and vise-versa. It can be
formalized in SePL as follows:
FA(P1, . . . , Pn) ≈ P1 . . . Pn
.
3.5.4. Only-one-applicable:
Only-one-applicable between P1, . . . , Pn, denoted by OOA(P1, . . . , Pn): if more than one
policy is applicable, the result will be neither accept nor deny (without decision). Otherwise, the
unique applicable policy will be applied. It is formalized in SePL as follows:
OOA(P1, . . . , Pn) ≈ (P1 	 Σni=2Pi) + . . .+ (Pj 	 Σni=1,i 6=jPi) + . . .+ (Pn 	 Σn−1i=1 Pi)
14
<Policy PolicyId="SimplePolicy1"
Version="1.0" RuleCombiningAlgId="first-applicable">
<Description>Access control policy for "secret.txt" file</Description>
<Target>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="string-equal">
<AttributeValue >secret.txt</AttributeValue>
<AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false"
Category="resource"
AttributeId="resource-id"
DataType="string"/>
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
</Target>
<Rule RuleId= "SimpleRule1" Effect="Deny">
<Description> Don’t allow write in secret.txt
</Description>
<Target>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="string-equal">
<AttributeValue >write</AttributeValue>
<AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false"
Category="action"
AttributeId="action-id"
DataType="string"/>
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
</Target>
</Rule>
<Rule RuleId= "SimpleRule2" Effect="Deny">
<Description> Alice cannot read "secret.txt"
</Description>
<Target>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="string-equal">
<AttributeValue >Alice</AttributeValue>
<AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false"
Category="access-subject"
AttributeId="subject-id"
DataType="string"/>
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
<AnyOf>
<AllOf>
<Match MatchId="string-equal">
<AttributeValue >read</AttributeValue>
<AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false"
Category="action"
AttributeId="action-id"
DataType="string"/>
</Match>
</AllOf>
</AnyOf>
</Target>
</Rule>
</Policy>
Table 4: Example of XACML policies
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Table 5: From XACML-3.0 to SePL
d − e : XACML− 3.0 −→ PSL
(PolicySet) d< POLICYSET Pheader > [Description] Targets Policies [Obligation] [Advice] </ POLICYSET > e
= d Targets e : d Pheader e( d Policies e)
(Policy) d< POLICY Rheader > [Description] Targets Rules [Obligation] [Advice] </ POLICY > e
= d Targets e : d Rheader e(d Rules e)
(Policies) d Policy Policies e = d Policy e, d Policies e
(Rules) d< RULE Rheader > [Description] [Targets] [Condition] [Obligation] [Advice] </ RULE > e
= ([d Targets e] d [Condition] e)d Rheader e
PSheader d PolicySetId = string Version = number PolicyCombiningAlgId = Palg e = d Palg e
(Pheader) d PolicyeId = string Version = number RuleCombiningAlgId = Ralg e = d Ralg e
(Rheader) d RuleId = string Effect = REffect e =→ d REffect e
(Palg) d only-one-applicable e = OOA
d deny-overrides e = DO
d permit-overrides e = PO
d first-applicable e = FA
d ordered-permit-overrides e = OPO
(REffect) d Permit e = p
d Deny e = d
(Targets) d< TARGET > [MatchAny] < / TARGET > e = d [MatchAny] e
(MatchAny) d< AnyOf > matchAll < / AnyOf > e = dmatchAll e
d< AnyOf > matchAll < / AnyOf >MatchAny e = dmatchAll edMatchAny e
(MatchAll) d< AllOf >Matches < / AnyOf > e = dMatches e
d< AnyOf >Matches < / AllOf >MatchAll e = dMatches edMatchAll e
(Matches) dMatch Matches e = dMatch e dMatches e
(Match) d< Match MatchID = MatchId >
< AttrValue > value < / AttrValue >
< AttributeDesignator ADHeader / >
< / Match >e
= MatchId(d ADHeader e, value)
(ADHeader) d Category= Subject AttributeId = AttSubject DataType= type MustBePresent= boolean e = AttSubject
d Category= resource AttributeId = AttResource DataType= type MustBePresent= boolean e = AttResource
d Category= action AttributeId = AttAction DataType= type MustBePresent= boolean e = AttAction
d Category= environment AttributeId = AttEnv DataType= type MustBePresent= boolean e = AttEnv
(Condition) d< Condition > BooleanExpression < / Condition > e = BooleanExpression
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3.5.5. Deny-unless-permit
Deny-unless-permit between P1, . . . , Pn is formalized in SePL as follows:
DUP (P1, . . . , Pn) ≈ p(P1T. . . TPn)
3.5.6. Permit-unless-deny
Permit-unless-deny between P1, . . . , Pn is formalized in SePL as follows:
DUP (P1, . . . , Pn) ≈ p(P1U . . .UPn)
3.6. Some Benefits of XACML Formalization
It is a known fact that formalization removes ambiguity from the textual description of se-
mantics and opens the door to a variety of automatic analysis. Formalization transforms XACML
policies to mathematical objects and allows to extract their properties (complete, conflicts, etc.)
and their interrelationship (include, disjoint, etc.). Here are some useful applications:
• Simplifying security policies: Given a security policy P , we want to simplify it as much as
possible. If a security policy is formalized as a combination of boolean expressions, as in
SePL, many techniques allowing their simplifications exist. These kinds of simplifications
can be useful to reduce the time of verifying complex security policies.
• Detecting conflicts and redundancies: Given two security policies P and Q, we want to
compare them as it is reported in [13], i.e, P is equivalent to Q, P is included in Q, P
and Q are disjoint, etc. This kind of analysis can be used to detect a conflict between rules
(when some of them authorize access denied by others). For instance, if one rule allows
an employee to get access into the system between 8am and 7pm and another denies the
access between 5am and 8am, then there is a conflict. In fact, if the combining algorithm
is “only-one-applicable”, then the result can be indeterminate. It is preferable to detect this
kind of overlap and show it to the end-user since they usually correspond to design errors
in security policies. For the SePL language, since security policies are transformed into
boolean expressions, different kinds of comparisons become easy. For instance, to compare
whether P1 and P2 are equivalent or not, it is enough to check whether the expression (P1 ⇒
P2) ∧ (P2 ⇒ P1) can be proved.
• Quantify distances between security policies: Given two security policies P and Q, we want
to measure the distance between them. Many works like [16] and [22] have already addressed
this problem. Our absolute semantics is helpful to define metrics allowing to measure dis-
tance between security policies. In fact, this semantics transforms a security policy to a
domain (acceptance domain, reject domain). Therefore, we can use the Euclidean distance
or other metrics in these domains to quantify similarity between them.
We have also developed, using PHP and XML, a web based application allowing to automat-
ically measure distances between XACML policies, transformed to SPL , using a variety of
metrics as shown by Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Measuring distances between XACML policies based on SPL
• Detecting incompleteness in security policy: Since our absolute semantics gives to any secu-
rity policy P a pair (A,D) as semantics where A is the domain of accept and D the domain
of deny, it is easy to extract the incompleteness domain of P which is ID = D − (A ∪D).
This ID shows the part of the domain where P is mute. If P is the whole security policy, then
it is incomplete. In fact, a good security policy should have ID = ∅ (i.e. any action should be
either denied or authorized). If for example, there is a rule stating that an employee can get
access into the system between 8am to 5pm and a rule stating that the same employee cannot
get access into the system between in [7pm, 8am], then it is incomplete since we don’t know
whether the employee is authorized or not in ]5am, 7am[. Let P be a security policy such that
its relative semantics in SePL is (B+P , B
−
P ) where B
+
P and B
−
P are two boolean expressions
capturing the acceptance and the denial part of P . We can detect whether P is complete or
not by verifying that B+P ∨B−P is always true or not.
• Using MTBDD techniques and tools: Since our relative semantics transforms XACML poli-
cies into boolean expressions where variables are elementary conditions, we can proceed
like in [23] or in [12] to produce Multi-Terminal Binary Decision Diagrams (MTBDD). This
MTBDD is useful to quickly analyze security policies and compare them. For instance, sup-
pose that [[ P ]]Γ = (a1 ∧ a2 ∧ a3,¬a1 ∧ a2 ∧ a3 ∧ a4), where a1 is “role = admin”, a2
is “file = pwd”, a3 is “access = write” and a4 is “role = student”. An MTBDD for P
can be as shown in Figure 3.4. The reader can refer to [10] to know how we can produce a
MTBDD with optimal size.
For MTBDDs, we can answer YES or NO questions like is it possible that “student” can
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Figure 3.4: MTBDD Associated to XACML Policy
“write” in the “pwd” file. We can answer queries such as who has access to “pwd” file and
we can compare two policies. A tool like Margave [14] is suitable to make this analysis.
Combining MTBDDs related to two security policies can reveal similarity and dissimilarity
between them as shown in Figure 3.5, where leafs having two similar labels show similarity
and leafs having two different labels denote dissimilarity. A tool like Exam [22] can do this
kind of analysis.
Figure 3.5: Combining MTBDD
Other interesting formalizations and analyses are also possible. For instance, Bryans et al.[11]
formalize a fragment of XACML by translating it to the process algebra CSP [4]. This gives the
possibility of using model checkers such as FDR to verify properties of security policies and to
compare them to each others.
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4. Completeness of SePL
Theorem 4.1. The language is complete with respect to set theory according to the following
meaning: let P and P ′ be two policies such that [[ P ]] = (A,D) and [[ P ′ ]] = (A′, D′),
we can build using the operator of the SePL a policy where the semantics has the form
(f(A,D,A′, D′), g((A,D,A′, D′)) where f and g are built based on the combination of ∪, ∩,
− and complement and f(A,D,A′, D′) and g(A,D,A′, D′) are disjoint. The importance of such
result is that it gives a lower bound for the expressiveness of SePL that seems to be enough for
capturing almost all combining algorithms of XACML since they are related to combining sets
(accepting and denying sets).
Proof. If we are able to build the policies F such that [[ F ]] = (f(A,D,A′, D′),⊥) and G such
that [[ G ]] = (⊥, g((A,D,A′, D′)). Then, since f(A,D,A′, D′) and g((A,D,A′, D′) are disjoint,
we deduce that
[[ F +G ]] = (f(A,D,A′, D′), g((A,D,A′, D′))
We notice also that if we are able to build F , it is immediate that we can build G. Now, let us
prove that we can build F . We do the proof by induction on the size of F . We show that we can
build F if it contains zero operator then we suppose that we can build it for any size lower or equal
than n and prove that that we can build it for a size n+ 1.
• n = 0: In this case f(A,D,A′, D′) has one of the following forms:
• f(A,D,A′, D′) = A, in this case it is immediate that F = P ||1
• f(A,D,A′, D′) = D, in this case it is immediate that F = (¬P )||1
• f(A,D,A′, D′) = A′, in this case it is immediate that F = P ′||1
• f(A,D,A′, D′) = D′, in this case it is immediate that F = (¬P ′)||1
• n + 1: In this case there exist f1 and f2 such that size(f1) ≤ n, size(f2) ≤ n and
f(A,D,A′, D′) has one of the following forms:
• f(A,D,A′, D′) = f1(A,D,A′, D′) ∪ f2(A,D,A′, D′)
By induction, it follows that there exist F1 and F2 such that [[ F1 ]] =
(f1((A,D,A
′, D′),⊥) and [[ F2 ]] = (f2((A,D,A′, D′),⊥). It follows from the defi-
nition of the semantics of [[ (P +Q) ]] that [[ F1 +F2 ]] = (f(A,D,A′, D′),⊥) and we
conclude that
F = F1 + F2
• f(A,D,A′, D′) = f1(A,D,A′, D′) ∩ f2(A,D,A′, D′)
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By induction, it follows that there exist F1 and F2 such that [[ F1 ]] =
(f1((A,D,A
′, D′),⊥) and [[ F2 ]] = (f2((A,D,A′, D′),⊥). It follows from the def-
inition of the semantics of [[ (P ||Q) ]] that [[ F1||F2 ]] = (f(A,D,A′, D′),⊥) and we
conclude that
F = F1||F2
• f(A,D,A′, D′) = f1(A,D,A′, D′)− f2(A,D,A′, D′)
By induction, it follows that there exist F1 and F2 such that [[ F1 ]] =
(f1((A,D,A
′, D′),⊥) and [[ F2 ]] = (f2((A,D,A′, D′),⊥). It follows from the def-
inition of the semantics of [[ (P + Q) ]] that [[ F1 + ¬F2 ]] = (f1(A,D,A′, D′) −
f2(A,D,A
′, D′), f2(A,D,A′, D′)− f1(A,D,A′, D′)) and we conclude that
F = (F1 + ¬F2)||1
• f(A,D,A′, D′) = f1(A,D,A′, D′)
By induction, it follows that there exist F1 such that [[ F1 ]] = (f1((A,D,A′, D′),⊥) .
It follows from the definition of the semantics of [[ (P +Q) ]] that [[ 1 +¬F1 ]] = (D−
f1(A,D,A
′, D′), f1(A,D,A′, D′)−D) = (f1(A,D,A′, D′),⊥) and we conclude that
F = 1 + ¬F1
Corollary 4.2. Let P and P ′ two policies such that [[ P ]] = (A,D) and [[ P ′ ]] = (A′, D′). The
previous theorem gives an algorithm that allows to construct Q such that
[[ Q ]] = (f(A,D,A′, D′), g(A,D,A′, D′))
The algorithm is as follows:
1: function Semantics2Policy
2: Input: (A,D) , (A′, D′) and (f, g)
3: Output: A policy Q such [[ Q ]] = (f, g)
4: return S2P((A,D), (A′, D′), f) + ¬(S2P((A,D), (A′, D′), g))
5: end function
The function S2P is defined as follows:
1: function S2P
2: Input: (A,D), (A′, D′) and f
3: Switch
4: case A: return P ||1
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5: case D: return ¬P ||1
6: case A′: return P ′||1
7: case D′: return ¬P ′||1
8: case f1 ∪ f2 : return S2P((A,D), (A′, D′), f1) + S2P((A,D), (A′, D′), f2)
9: case f1 ∩ f2 : return S2P((A,D), (A′, D′), f1) || S2P((A,D), (A′, D′), f2)
10: case f1 − f2 : return (S2P((A,D), (A′, D′), f1) + (¬(S2P((A,D), (A′, D′), f2))) || 1)
11: case f1 : return 1 + ¬(S2P((A,D), (A′, D′), f1))
12: end function
Proof. It is immediate from the constructive proof of Theorem 4.1
5. Simplifying SePL
Definition 5.1. Let P1 and P2 be two policies such that [[ P1 ]] = (A1, D1) and [[ P2 ]] = (A2, D2).
We say that:
• P1 is lower than P2, denoted by P1 v P2 if A1 ⊆ A2 and D1 ⊆ D2.
• P1 is equivalent to P2, denoted by P1 ≈ P2 if P1 v P2 and P2 v P1.
Proposition 5.2. Let P1, P2 and P3 be three policies. We have:
P1UP2 ≈ ¬(¬P1T¬P2)
Proof.
[[ ¬(¬P1T¬P2) ]]
= {| Definition of [[ ¬(P ) ]] |}
[[ ¬P1T¬P2 ]]
= {| Definition of [[ PTQ ]] |}
((D1 ∪D2, (A1 −D2) ∪ (A2 −D1))
= {| Definition of (α, β) |}
(((A1 −D2) ∪ (A2 −D1), D1 ∪D2)
= {| Definition of [[ PUQ ]] |}
[[ P1UP2 ]]
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Proposition 5.3. Let P1, P2 and P3 be three policies. We have the following results:
1. P1 + P2 ≈ P2 + P1)
2. P1 + (P2) + P3) ≈ (P1 + P2) + P3
3. P1||P2 ≈ P2||P1
4. P1||(P2)||P3) ≈ (P1||P2)||P3
5. (P1 + P2)||P3 ≈ P1||P3 + P2||P3
6. ¬1 ≈ 0
7. ¬0 ≈ 1
8. ¬ε ≈ ε
9. ¬(¬P1) ≈ P1
10. ¬(P1||P2) ≈ ¬P1||¬P2
11. ¬(P1 + P2) ≈ ¬P1 + ¬P2
12. P1 + ¬P2 ≈ ε
13. P1 + ε ≈ P1
14. P1||¬P2 ≈ ε
Proof. Most of them are immediate from the definition of the semantics
Theorem 5.4. The following language has the same expressivity as SePL:
P,P1,P2 ::= R | ¬P | pP | P1 ‖ P2
| P1 + P2 | P1 	 P2
R ::= < ϕ1, ϕ2 >
Proof.
• Since [[ P − P ′ ]] = (A − (A′ ∪ D′), D − (A′ ∪ D′)), then from Corollary 4.2 we have:
P − P ′ ≈ (P ||1 + ¬(P ′||1 + ¬P ′||1))||1 + ¬((¬P ||1 + ¬(P ′||1 + ¬P ′||1))||1)
• Since [[ P.P ′ ]] = (A ∪ (A′ −D), D ∪ (D′ −A)), then from Corollary 4.2 we have: P.P ′ ≈
P ||1 + (P ′||1 + ¬(¬P ||1))||1 + ¬(¬P ||1 + (¬P ′||1 + ¬(P ||1)||1))
• Since [[ PTP ′ ]] = (A ∪ A′, (D − A′) ∪ (D′ − A)), then from Corollary 4.2 we have:
P.P ′ ≈ P ||1 + P ′||1 + ¬((¬P ||1 + ¬(P ′||1))||1 + (¬P ′||1 + ¬(P ||1))||1)
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6. Comparison with the Related Work
The standard language XACML is increasingly used in a wide variety of domains. A security
policy can involve a big number of rules combined using different algorithms. However, since
the semantics of XACML is described using the natural language, it will be difficult and time
consuming for humans to get its meaning and analyze it. For that reason, many formal languages
have been defined during the few past years and used to capture and analyze security policies
specified in XACML or other security policy languages. We review in what follows these research
initiatives and pinpoint the differences with our work.
D-algebra. In [19], Ni et al. define the elegant D-algebra as follows:
Definition 6.1 (D-Algebra). Let D be a nonempty set of elements, 0 be a constant element of D,
¬ be a unary operation on element in D, and ⊕D, ⊗D be binary operations on element in D. A
D-Algebra is an algebraic structure (D,¬,⊕D,⊗D, 0) closed on ¬, ⊕D, ⊗D and satisfying the
following axioms:
1. x⊕D y = y ⊕D x
2. (x⊕D y)⊕D z = x⊕D (y ⊕D z)
3. x⊕D 0 = x
4. ¬¬x = x
5. x⊕D ¬0 = ¬0
6. ¬(¬x⊕D y)⊕D y = ¬(¬y ⊕D x)⊕D x
7. x⊗D y =
{ ¬0 : x = y
0 : x 6= y
The interpretation of D-Algebra on XACML decisions is as follows:
• D is P({p, d, n
a
}), where ∅ is the empty policy, {p} is permit, {d} is deny, {n
a
} is not
applicable, {p, d} is conflict, {p, n
a
} is indeterminate permit, {d, n
a
} is indeterminate deny
and {p, d, n
a
} is indeterminate permit-deny.
• 0 is the empty set.
• ¬x is ({p, d, n
a
} − x).
• x⊕D y is x ∪ y.
• x⊗D y is defined by axiom 7.
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The formalization of permit-overrides of two policies x and y in D-Algebra is given by
fpo(x, y) as follows:
fpo(x, y) = (x⊕D y)
= 	D(((x⊗D {p})⊕D (y ⊗D {p}))
D{d, n
a
})
= 	D(¬((xD y)⊗D {n
a
})D {n
a
}
D¬((x×D ∅)⊕D (y×D))
where (xD y) and (x	D y) are shortcuts for ¬(¬x⊕D ¬y) and (xD ¬y) respectively.
D-Algebra is neither conform with XACML-3.0 nor with XACML-2.0. As in [25], we show in
Table 7 the result of applying the “permit-overrides” algorithm for composing P1 = {p, n
a
} (In-
determinate Permit) and P2 = {d} (Deny). The result expected by XACML-3.0 is “Indeterminate
Permit-Deny”, however D-Algebra returns conflict.
PBel Logic. In [17, 18], the authors use a four value logic (grant, deny, conflict, undefined) called
PBel and it is derived from the Blenap Logic [3]. They also define a query language allowing
to specify questions related to policy analysis such as conflict freedom and gap freedom policies.
Queries are finally transformed into a fragment of the first order logic for which satisfiability and
validity checks can be done by SAT solvers or BDDs.
The syntax of PBel is as shown in the following BNF grammar:
p, q ::= Policy
b if api Basic policy
¬p Logical negation
p ∧ q Logical meet
p ⊃ q Implication
p⊕ q Nondeterministic choice
p[v 7→ q] Refinement
where api are access predicates, b is either tt (permit) of ff (deny) and v is either ⊥ (non-
applicable) or> (indeterminate, i.e., both permit and deny arise). p⊕q grants (respectively denies)
an access if at least one accepts (receptively denies) and the other is either accept (respectively
deny) or not applicable. p[v 7→ q] yields p if p 6= v and q otherwise. Using this semantics, the
authors formalize the “permit-overrides” algorithm as follows: (p ⊕ q)[> 7→ ff ]. However, as
shown in [25], this formalization is not consistent with XACML. In fact, the result of “permit-
overrides” algorithm for composing P1 = > (Indeterminate) and P2 = ff (deny) should be,
according to XACML, indeterminate and not deny as returned by this logic.
XACML Logic. In [25], the authors proposed an XACML logic having the syntax shown in Table
6:
• The semantics of Match, Target and Condition is given by a function [−] returning results
in the three-valued lattice V3({>, I,⊥},≤), where > ≤ I ≤ ⊥ and > means match (also
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Table 6: Syntax of the Logic of XACML [25]
PolicySet ::= < Target,< PolicySet1, ..., PolicySetm >, θ >
| < Target, hPolicy1, ..., Policym >, θ > where m ≥ 0
Policy ::= < Target,< Rule1, ..., Rulem >, where m ≥ 1
Rule ::= < Effect, Target, Condition >
Condition ::= propositional formulae
Target : := Null
|AnyOf1 ∧ ... ∧AnyOfm where m ≥ 1
AnyOf ::= AllOf1 ∨ ... ∨AllOfm where m ≥ 1
AllOf ::= Match1 ∧ ... ∧Matchm where m ≥ 1
Match ::= Φ(α)
Φ ::= subject |action |resource |enviroment
α ::= attribute value
θ ::= p− o | d− o | f − a | o− 1− a
Effect ::= d | p
XACML Request Component
Request ::= A1, ..., Am where m ≥ 1
A ::= Φ(α) | external state
means true or applicable), ⊥ means not match (also means false or not applicable) and I
means indeterminate.
• The semantics of a MatchM for a given query Q, denoted by [M](Q) is > ifM∈ Q, ⊥ if
M 6∈ Q and I if there is an error during evaluation.
• The semantics of a Condition C for a given query Q is eval(C,Q), where eval is a given
function that evaluates conditions.
• The semantics of composed elements using ∧ such that [E1∧ . . .∧En](Q) , where E1, . . . , En
are Targets or AllOfs, is [E1](Q) u . . . u [En](Q) where u gives the least upper bound
according to the lattice V3.
• The semantics of composed elements using ∨ such that [E1∨ . . .∨En](Q) , where E1, . . . , En
AnyOfs, is [E1](Q)unionsq . . .unionsq [En](Q) where unionsq gives the greatest lower bound according to the
lattice V3.
• To give the semantics of a Rule, the authors extended V3 to V6 = {>p,>d, Ip, Id, Ipd,⊥}
where >p is Permit, >d is Deny, Ip is Indeterminate Permit, Id is Indeterminate Deny, Ipd is
Indeterminate Permit-Deny, and ⊥ is Not match.
• The semantics of a RuleR =< ∗, T , C >, where ∗ is either p or d, is as follows:
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Figure 6.1: Lp−o
Table 7: Consistency of various logics with respect to XACML
Logic P1 P2 Permit-Overrides Algorithm Result Consistancy
Belnap logic > ff (>⊕ ff)(> 7→ ff) ff −
D −Algebra {p, n
a
} {d} fpo({p, n
a
}, {d}) {p, d} −
V 6 Ip >d
⊕
p−o(< Id,>d >) Idp
√
P [0,
1
2
] [0, 1]
⊕
p−o(< [0,
1
2
], [0, 1] >) [
1
2
,
1
2
]
√
SePL (?,F) (F,T) ∨ (?,T) (?,F)⊕ ((F,T)) ∨ (?,T) (?, ?) √
[R](Q) =

>∗ [T ](Q) = > and [C](Q) = >
⊥∗ ([T ](Q) = > and [C](Q) = ⊥)
or [T ](Q) = ⊥
I∗ otherwise
• For the combining algorithms “po”, “do”, “fa” and “o − 1 − a”, different lattices and com-
bining rules are used to define the semantics. For the po for example, the lattice Lp−o of
Figure 6.1 is used. For a sequence S =< P1, . . . , Pn > of policies, the permit override of
S, denoted by
⊕
p−o(S), is unionsqp−o{s1, . . . , sn}, where si is the semantics of Pi and unionsqp−o is
the greatest lower bound according to the lattice Lp−o.
• The authors defined also an equivalent semantics to V6, called P , based on the set
{[0, 0], [1
2
, 0], [0,
1
2
], [
1
2
,
1
2
], [1, 0], [0, 1]}, where [0, 0] is equivalent to ⊥, [1
2
, 0] is equiva-
lent to Id, [0,
1
2
] is equivalent to Ip, [
1
2
,
1
2
] is equivalent to Idp, [1, 0] is equivalent to >d and
[0, 1] is equivalent to >p.
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Fine-grained Integration Algebra (FIA). In [23], Rao et al. proposed a Fine-grained Integration
Algebra, denoted by FIA, for policy integration. It is a three-valued and language-independent
algebra defined by the following element (Σ, PY, PN,+,&,¬,Πdc), where Σ is a vocabulary
of attribute names and their domains, PY and PN are two policy constants, + and & are
two binary operators, and ¬ and Πdc are two unary operators. The semantics of a policy P
can be considered as a 2-tuple (RPY , R
P
N ) where R
P
Y and R
P
N are the sets of requests that are
permitted and denied by P respectively, and RPY ∩ RPN = ∅. A policy P is considered as
not applicable, if the request is not in RPY ∪ RPN . The semantics of P can also be viewed
as a function mapping each request to a value in {Y,N,NA}. A request r is a set of pairs
{(a1, v1), (a2, v2), . . . , (an, vn)} where, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ai is an attribute name and vi
is a value in the domain of ai, e. g. r = {(role,manager), (act, read), (time, 10am)}.
PY is a policy constant that permits everything whereas PN is the one that denies everything.
P1 + P2 = (RP1Y ∪RP2Y , (RP1N −RP1Y ) ∪ (RP2N −RP2Y )), P1&P2 = (RP1Y ∩RP2Y , RP1N ∩RP2),
¬P = (PN , PY ), Πdc(P ) = ({r ∈ PY and r satisfies dc}, {r ∈ PN and r satisfies dc}). The au-
thors used FIA to express the following XACML policy combining algorithms: Permit-overrides,
Deny-overrides, First-one-applicable, Only-one-applicable. For instance, the combination of poli-
cies P1, . . . , Pn under the algorithm Permit-overrides is expressed by P1 + . . .+Pn. Nevertheless,
no one of these combination algorithms is XACML compatible since the algebra does not deal with
indeterminate situation such that Indeterminate Permit and Indeterminate Deny. Furthermore, the
authors do not give any translation function from XACML to FIA.
Defeasible Description Logic (DDL). In [15], Kolovski et al. used an extended version of De-
scription Logic called Defeasible Description Logic (DDL). The authors succeed to transform the
main concepts of XACML (attribute, value, effect, Rule, Policy) to DDL in order to make differ-
ent formal analysis such as policy comparison and verification. They claimed that their XACML
formalization supports Permit-Overrides, Deny-Overrides and First-Applicable combining algo-
rithms. However, there XACML formalizations are not compatible with XACML since they do
not handle indeterminate cases like Indeterminate Permit, Indeterminate Deny and Indeterminate
Permit-Deny.
Table 8: Comparison with the related work
Features/Languages Belnap Logic D −Algebra V 6 P DDL FIA SePL
The logic addresses explicitly XACML-3.0
√ √ √
The compatibility with XACML algorithms has been proved
√
The language is generic: syntax and sematics are independent from XACML
√ √ √ √ √
Logic is endowed with a semantics that is independent from any evaluaion model
√ √
Advantages of using SePL. Here, we compare the previous logics to SePL. Table 8 summarizes
this comparison.
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• Contrarily to the XACML logic, SePL, Belnap-Logic andD−Algebra are independent from
XACML. This means that if we want to formalize a larger subset of XACML, we do not
necessarily need to extend the language itself. Besides, other policy languages, especially
those used to specify firewall policies, can also be formalized using languages like SePL,
Belnap-Logic and D −Algebra.
• The compatibility of SePL has been formally proved for almost all the combining algorithms.
For Belnap Logic and D-Algebra, there is a proof that they are not compatible and for V 6
and P there is neither proof of compatibility nor a proof of incompatibility for all combining
algorithms.
• Like V 6 and P , SePL addresses the recent version XACML-3.0. However, SePL formal-
izes a larger fragment of XACML-3.0 than V 6 and P and it includes most of combining
algorithms.
• The SePL logic is endowed with an absolute semantics based on set theory allowing to un-
derstand the meaning of operators and policies and to analyze them outside any interpretation
model. Another interesting application of this semantics is that it allows easily quantify dis-
tance between XACML policies. In fact, the absolute semantics of a policy is a domain (a
subsets of D) so measuring distances between policies is equivalent to measuring distance
between domains and there are many distance metrics allowing that such as Euclidean dis-
tance.
• Many Multi-valued logics (3-valued, 4-valued, 6-valued) have been used to formalize
XACML semantics. However, it was not always clearly justified how many values we
need and why. This is not the case for SePL, since the semantics of policy is a pair
where each element has 3 possible values (T, F or ?), we obtain an 8-valued logic ((T,T),
(T,F), {(T, ?), (F,T), (F, ?), (?, ?)} allowing to easily distinguish the six different sce-
narios of XACML-3.0 (Pemit, Deny, IndeterminatePermit, IndeterminateDeny,
IndeterminatePermitDeny and NotApplicable).
7. Conclusion
We presented in this paper a simple, formal, and compact security policy language called
SePL. We have shown how complex real-world security policy languages, such as XACML-3.0
can be captured in a simple and understandable way using SePL. Furthermore, we proved the
completeness of SePL with respect to set theory and we proposed a tool allowing to automatically
transform XACML policies to SPL and measure distances between them.
Our future work includes the extension of the tool so that we can simplify security policies,
detect their conflict, redundancy and incompleteness, and integrate the MTBDD techniques to
answer more questions about them.
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Appendix
We provide in this part, the proofs of the conformance of our semantics for each XACML
combining algorithm and its XACML specification.
7.1. Permit-override:
Permit-overrides between P1, . . . , Pn, denoted by POR(P1, . . . , Pn): It accepts if at least one
policy accepts and denies if no one accept and at least one denies. It can be formalized in SePL as
follows:
POR(P1, . . . , Pn) ≈ P1T. . . TPn
.
According to the XACML specification [27], we have:
“The permit overrides combining algorithm is intended for those cases where a permit decision
should have priority over a deny decision. This algorithm has the following behavior.
1. If any decision is “Permit”, the result is “Permit”.
2. Otherwise, if any decision is “IndeterminateDP”, the result is “IndeterminateDP”.
3. Otherwise, if any decision is “IndeterminateP” and another decision is “IndeterminateD” or
“Deny”, the result is “IndeterminateDP”.
4. Otherwise, if any decision is “IndeterminateP”, the result is “IndeterminateP”.
5. Otherwise, if any decision is “Deny”, the result is “Deny”.
6. Otherwise, if any decision is “IndeterminateD”, the result is “IndeterminateD”.
7. Otherwise, the result is “NotApplicable”.
”
Let [[ P1 ]]Γ = (a1, d1) [[ P2 ]]Γ = (a2, d2), from the definition of relative semantics, we have:
[[ P1TP2 ]]Γ = (a1 ∨ a2, (d1 − a2) ∨ (d2 − a1))
where a− b is an abbreviation of a ∧ ¬b
Now let’s see whether our semantics is compliant with the XACML specification.
1. Suppose that [[ P1 ]]Γ = Permit (The result is the same when we consider [[ P2 ]]Γ = Permit
since the operator T is commutative ). It means, from the definition of Permit, that [[ P1 ]]Γ =
(T, d1) where d1 ∈ {F, ?}. Suppose that [[ P2 ]]Γ = (a2, d2). It follows that:
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[[ P1TP2 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P1TP2 ]]Γ|}
(T ∨ a2, (d1 − a2) ∨ (d2 − T))
= {|From the truth tables (T ∨ a2) = T|}
(T, (d1 − a2) ∨ (d2 − T))
= {|a− b = a ∧ ¬b|}
(T, (d1 ∧ ¬a2) ∨ (d2 ∧ ¬T))
= {|From the truth tables|}
(T, (d1 ∧ ¬a2))
= {|since d1 ∈ {F, ?} then from the truth tables (d1 ∧ ¬a2) ∈ {F, ?|}
Permit
2. Suppose that [[ P1 ]]Γ = Indeterminate(PD) (The result is the same when we consider
[[ P2 ]]Γ = Indeterminate(PD) since the operator T is commutative ). It means from the
definition of Indeterminate(PD), that [[ P1 ]]Γ = (?, ?). Suppose also that [[ P2 ]]Γ = (a2, d2)
where a2 ∈ {F, ?} (i.e [[ P2 ]]Γ is not a Permit). It follows that:
[[ P1TP2 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P1TP2 ]]Γ|}
(? ∨ a2, (?− a2) ∨ (d2−?))
= {| Definition of a− b|}
(? ∨ a2, (? ∧ ¬a2) ∨ (d2 ∧ ¬?))
= {| From the truth tables since a2 ∈ {F, ?}, we have (? ∨ a2) =?|}
(?, (? ∧ ¬a2) ∨ (d2 ∧ ¬?))
= {|a2 ∈ {F, ?} then, from truth table, ¬a2 ∈ {T, ?} and (? ∧ ¬a) =?|}
(?, (? ∨ (d2 ∧ ¬?))
= {| From the truth table ¬? =?|}
(?, (? ∨ (d2∧?))
= {| From the truth table (d2∧?) ∈ {F, ?}|}
(?, (? ∨ (d2∧?))
= {| From the truth tables since (d2∧?) ∈ {F, ?} then ? ∨ (d2∧?) =?|}
(?, ?)
= Indeterminate(PD)
3. Let [[ P1 ]]Γ = (?,F) = Indeterminate(P) and [[ P2 ]]Γ = (F, ?) = Indeterminate(D) or
[[ P2 ]]Γ = Deny ∈ {(F,T), (?,T)}
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[[ P1TP2 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P1TP2 ]]Γ|}
(? ∨ a2, (F− a2) ∨ (d2−?))
= {| Definition of a− b|}
(? ∨ a2, (F ∧ ¬a2) ∨ (d2 ∧ ¬?))
= {| From the truth tables |}
(?,F ∨ (d2∧?))
= {| From the truth tables |}
(?, (d2∧?))
= {| From the truth tables since d2 ∈ {T, ?}|}
(?, ?)
= Indeterminate(PD)
4. Suppose that [[ P1 ]]Γ = Indeterminate(P) (The result is the same when we consider
[[ P2 ]]Γ = Indeterminate(P) since the operator T is commutative ). We suppose that
[[ P2 ]]Γ 6= Permit , [[ P2 ]]Γ 6= Indeterminate(D), [[ P2 ]]Γ 6= Indeterminate(PD) and
[[ P2 ]]Γ 6= Deny. It means that [[ P1 ]]Γ = (?,F) and [[ P2 ]]Γ = N/A or [[ P2 ]]Γ =
Indeterminate(P). It follows that [[ P1 ]]Γ = (?,F) and [[ P2 ]]Γ = (a2,F)
[[ P1TP2 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P1TP2 ]]Γ|}
(? ∨ a2, (F− a2) ∨ F−?))
= {| Definition of a− b|}
(? ∨ a2, (F ∧ ¬a2) ∨ (F ∧ ¬?))
= {| From the truth tables |}
(?,F)
= Indeterminate(P)
5. Suppose that [[ P1 ]]Γ = Deny (The result is the same when we consider [[ P2 ]]Γ = Deny
since the operator T is commutative ). We suppose that [[ P2 ]]Γ 6= Permit , [[ P2 ]]Γ 6=
Indeterminate(P) and [[ P2 ]]Γ 6= Indeterminate(PD). It means that [[ P1 ]]Γ = (F,T)
and [[ P2 ]]Γ = N/A, [[ P2 ]]Γ = Indeterminate(D) or [[ P2 ]]Γ = Deny. It follows that
[[ P1 ]]Γ = (F,T) and [[ P2 ]]Γ = (F, d2)
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[[ P1TP2 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P1TP2 ]]Γ|}
(F ∨ F, (d2 − F) ∨ T− F))
= {| Definition of a− b|}
(F ∨ F, (d2 ∧ ¬F) ∨ (T ∧ ¬F))
= {| From the truth tables |}
(F, d2 ∨ T)
= {| From the truth tables |}
(F,T)
= Deny
6. Suppose that [[ P1 ]]Γ = Indeterminate(D) (The result is the same when we consider
[[ P2 ]]Γ = Indeterminate(D) since the operator T is commutative ). We suppose that
[[ P2 ]]Γ 6= Permit , [[ P2 ]]Γ 6= Indeterminate(P), [[ P2 ]]Γ 6= Indeterminate(PD) and
[[ P2 ]]Γ 6= Deny. It means that [[ P1 ]]Γ = (F, ?) and [[ P2 ]]Γ = N/A or [[ P2 ]]Γ =
Indeterminate(D) . It follows that [[ P1 ]]Γ = (F, ?) and [[ P2 ]]Γ = (F, d2) and d2 ∈ {F, ?}
[[ P1TP2 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P1TP2 ]]Γ|}
(F ∨ F, (d2 − F) ∨ (?− F))
= {| Definition of a− b|}
(F ∨ F, (d2 ∧ ¬F) ∨ (? ∧ ¬F))
= {| From the truth tables |}
(F, d2∨?)
= {| From the truth tables since d2 ∈ {F, ?}|}
(F, ?)
= Indeterminate(D)
7. Otherwise [[ P1 ]]Γ = N/A = (F,F) and [[ P2 ]]Γ = N/A = (F,F) .
[[ P1TP2 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P1TP2 ]]Γ|}
(F ∨ F, (F− F) ∨ (F− F))
= {| Definition of a− b|}
(F ∨ F, (F ∧ ¬F) ∨ (F ∧ ¬F))
= {| From the truth tables |}
(F,F)
= N/A
7.2. Deny-overrides:
Deny-overrides between P1, . . . , Pn, denoted by DOR(P1, . . . , Pn): It denies if at least one
policy denies and accepts if no one denies and at least one accepts. It can be formalized in SePL as
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follows:
DOR(P1, . . . , Pn) ≈ P1U . . .UPn
.
According to the XACML specification [27], we have:
The deny overrides combining algorithm is intended for those cases where a deny decision should
have priority over a permit decision. This algorithm has the following behavior.
1. If any decision is “Deny”, the result is “Deny”.
2. Otherwise, if any decision is “IndeterminateDP”, the result is “IndeterminateDP”.
3. Otherwise, if any decision is “IndeterminateD” and another decision is ?IndeterminateP or
Permit, the result is “IndeterminateDP”.
4. Otherwise, if any decision is “IndeterminateD”, the result is “IndeterminateD”.
5. Otherwise, if any decision is “Permit”, the result is “Permit”.
6. Otherwise, if any decision is “IndeterminateP”, the result is “IndeterminateP”.
7. Otherwise, the result is “NotApplicable”.
Our formalization feet with the XACML requirement and the proof is similar to the previous
one.
7.3. First-Applicable:
First-Applicable between P1, . . . , Pn, denoted by FA(P1, . . . , Pn): It accepts if there is at
least one policy that accepts and that is not proceeded by a denying one and vise-versa. It can be
formalized in SePL as follows:
FA(P1, . . . , Pn) ≈ P1. . . . .Pn
.
According to the XACML specification [27], we have:
The following is a non-normative informative description of the “First-Applicable? rule-combining
algorithm of a policy.
Each rule SHALL be evaluated in the order in which it is listed in the policy. For a particular rule, if
the target matches and the condition evaluates to “True”, then the evaluation of the policy SHALL
halt and the corresponding effect of the rule SHALL be the result of the evaluation of the policy (i.e.
“Permit” or “Deny”). For a particular rule selected in the evaluation, if the target evaluates to
“False” or the condition evaluates to “False”, then the next rule in the order SHALL be evaluated.
If no further rule in the order exists, then the policy SHALL evaluate to “NotApplicable”.
If an error occurs while evaluating the target or condition of a rule, then the evaluation SHALL
halt, and the policy shall evaluate to “Indeterminate”, with the appropriate error status.
We consider the following cases:
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1. First one accept: Suppose that [[ P1 ]]Γ = Permit = (T, d1) and [[ P2 ]]Γ = (a2, d2) where
d1 ∈ {F, ?}. It follows that:
[[ P1 · P2 ]]Γ)
= {|Definition of [[ P1 · P2 ]]Γ|}
(T ∨ (a2 − d1), d1 ∨ (d2 − T )
= {|From the truth tables |}
(T, d1 ∨ F )
= {|From the truth tables |}
(T, d1)
= Permit
2. First one deny: Suppose that [[ P1 ]]Γ = Deny = (a1, T ) and [[ P2 ]]Γ = (a2, d2) where
a1 ∈ {F, ?}. It follows that:
[[ P1 · P2 ]]Γ)
= {|Definition of [[ P1 · P2 ]]Γ|}
(a1 ∨ (a2 − T ), T ∨ (d2 − a1)
= {|From the truth tables |}
(a1 ∨ F, T )
= {|From the truth tables |}
(a1, T )
= Deny
3. First one not applicable: Suppose that [[ P1 ]]Γ = N/A = (F, F ) and [[ P2 ]]Γ = (a2, d2). It
follows that:
[[ P1 · P2 ]]Γ)
= {|Definition of [[ P1 · P2 ]]Γ|}
(F ∨ (a2 − F ), F ∨ (d2 − F )
= {|From the truth tables |}
(F ∨ a2, F ∨ d2)
= {|From the truth tables |}
(a2, d2)
= [[ P2 ]]Γ
4. First one indeterminate(P): Suppose that [[ P1 ]]Γ = Indeterminate(P) = (?, F ) and
[[ P2 ]]Γ = (a2, d2). It follows that:
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[[ P1 · P2 ]]Γ)
= {|Definition of [[ P1 · P2 ]]Γ|}
(? ∨ (a2 − F ), F ∨ (d2−?)
= {|From the truth tables |}
(? ∨ a2, d2∧?)
= {|From the truth tables |}
(?, ?)
= Indeterminate(PD)
5. First one indeterminate(D): Suppose that [[ P1 ]]Γ = Indeterminate(D) = (F, ?) and
[[ P2 ]]Γ = (a2, d2). It follows that:
[[ P1 · P2 ]]Γ)
= {|Definition of [[ P1 · P2 ]]Γ|}
(F ∨ (a2−?), ? ∨ (d2 − F )
= {|From the truth tables |}
(a2∧?, ? ∨ d2)
= {|From the truth tables |}
(?, ?)
= Indeterminate(PD)
6. First one indeterminate(PD): Suppose that [[ P1 ]]Γ = Indeterminate(PD) = (?, ?) and
[[ P2 ]]Γ = (a2, d2). It follows that:
[[ P1 · P2 ]]Γ)
= {|Definition of [[ P1 · P2 ]]Γ|}
(? ∨ (a2−?), ? ∨ (d2−?)
= {|From the truth tables |}
(? ∨ (a2∧?), ? ∨ (? ∧ d2))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(?∨?, ?∨?)
= {|From the truth tables |}
(?, ?)
= Indeterminate(PD)
7.4. Only-one-applicable:
Only-one-applicable between P1, . . . , Pn, denoted by OOA(P1, . . . , Pn): if more than one
policy is applicable, the result will be neither accept nor deny (without decision). Otherwise, the
unique applicable policy will be applied.
It can be formalized in SePL as follows:
OOA(P1, . . . , Pn) ≈ (P1 	 Σni=2Pi) + . . .+ (Pj 	 Σni=1,i 6=jPi) + . . .+ (Pn 	 Σn−1i=1 Pi)
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.
According to the XACML specification [27], we have:
” In the entire set of policies in the policy set, if no policy is considered applicable by virtue
of its target, then the result of the policy-combination algorithm SHALL be “NotApplicable”. If
more than one policy is considered applicable by virtue of its target, then the result of the policy
combination algorithm SHALL be “Indeterminate”.
If only one policy is considered applicable by evaluation of its target, then the result of the policy-
combining algorithm SHALL be the result of evaluating the policy.
If an error occurs while evaluating the target of a policy, or a reference to a policy is considered
invalid or the policy evaluation results in “Indeterminate, then the policy set SHALL evaluate to
“Indeterminate”, with the appropriate error status.”
We consider the following cases:
1. No one applicable: Suppose that [[ P1 ]]Γ = N/A = (F, F ) and [[ P2 ]]Γ = N/A = (F, F ). It
follows that:
[[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ|}
(F 	 (F ∨ F ), F 	 (F ∨ F ))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(F 	 F, F 	 F )
= {|From the truth tables |}
(F, F )
⇒ [[ (P1 	 P2) + (P2 	 P1) ]]Γ
((F, F ) + (F, F ))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(F ∨ F, F ∨ F )
= {|From the truth tables |}
(F, F )
= N/A
2. More than one applicable: We distinguish the following cases:
• [[ P1 ]]Γ = Permit = (T, d1) and [[ P2 ]]Γ = Permit = (T, d2) where {d1, d2} ⊆ {F, ?}.
It follows that:
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[[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ|}
(T 	 (T ∨ d2), d1 	 (T ∨ d2))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(T 	 T, d1 	 T ))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(?, d1)
⇒ [[ (P1 	 P2) + (P2 	 P1) ]]Γ
(?, d1) + (?, d2)
= {|From the definition of + |}
(? ∨ d1, ? ∨ d2)
= {|From the truth tables |}
(?, ?)
= Indeterminate(PD)
• [[ P1 ]]Γ = Deny = (d1, T ) and [[ P2 ]]Γ = Permit = (T, d2) where {d1, d2} ⊆ {F, ?}
(The result will be the same for the symmetric case). It follows that:
[[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ|}
(d1 	 (T ∨ d2), T 	 (T ∨ d2))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(d1 	 T, T 	 T ))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(d1, ?)
[[ P2 	 P1 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ|}
(T 	 (T ∨ d1), d2 	 (T ∨ d1))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(T 	 T, d2 	 T ))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(?, d2)
⇒ [[ (P1 	 P2) + (P2 	 P1) ]]Γ
(d1, ?) + (?, d2)
= {|From the definition of + |}
(d1∨?, ? ∨ d2)
= {|From the truth tables |}
(?, ?)
= Indeterminate(PD)
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• [[ P1 ]]Γ = Deny = (d1, T ) and [[ P2 ]]Γ = Deny = (d2, T ) where {d1, d2} ⊆ {F, ?}. It
follows that:
[[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ|}
(d1 	 (T ∨ d2), T 	 (T ∨ d2))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(d1 	 T, T 	 T ))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(d1, ?)
⇒ [[ (P1 	 P2) + (P2 	 P1) ]]Γ
(d1, ?) + (d2, ?)
= {|From the definition of + |}
(d1 ∨ d2, ?∨?)
= {|From the truth tables |}
(d1 ∨ d2, ?)
∈ {Indeterminate(PD), Indeterminate(D)}
• [[ P1 ]]Γ = Deny = (d1, T ) and [[ P2 ]]Γ = N/A = (F, F ) where d1 ∈ {F, ?} (The
result will be the same for the symmetric case). It follows that:
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[[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ|}
(d1 	 (F ∨ F ), T 	 (F ∨ F ))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(d1 	 F, T 	 F ))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(d1, T )
[[ P2 	 P1 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P2 	 P1 ]]Γ|}
(F 	 (T ∨ d1), F 	 (F ∨ d1))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(F 	 T, F 	 T ))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(F, F )
⇒ [[ (P1 	 P2) + (P2 	 P1) ]]Γ
(d1, T ) + (F, F )
= {|From the definition of + |}
(d1 ∨ F, T ∨ F )
= {|From the truth tables |}
(d1, T )
= Deny
• [[ P1 ]]Γ = Deny = (d1, T ) and [[ P2 ]]Γ = Indeterminate = (?, d2) where {d1, d2} ⊆
{F, ?} (The result will be the same for the symmetric case). It follows that:
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[[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ|}
(d1 	 (d2∨?), T 	 (d2∨?))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(d1	?, T	?))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(d1, ?)
[[ P2 	 P1 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P2 	 P1 ]]Γ|}
(?	 (T ∨ d1), d2 	 (T ∨ d1))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(?	 T, d2 	 T )
= {|From the truth tables since d2 ∈ {F, ?}|}
(?, d2)
⇒ [[ (P1 	 P2) + (P2 	 P1) ]]Γ
(d1, ?) + (?, d2)
= {|From the definition of + |}
(d1∨?, ? ∨ d2)
= {|From the truth tables |}
(?, ?)
= Indeterminate(PD)
• [[ P1 ]]Γ = Deny = (d1, T ) and [[ P2 ]]Γ = Indeterminate(D) = (F, ?) where d1 ∈
{F, ?} (The result will be the same for the symmetric case). It follows that:
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[[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ|}
(d1 	 (F∨?), T 	 (F∨?))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(d1	?, T	?))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(d1, ?)
[[ P2 	 P1 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P2 	 P1 ]]Γ|}
(F 	 (T ∨ d1), ?	 (T ∨ d1))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(F 	 T, ?	 T )
= {|From the truth tables |}
(F, ?)
⇒ [[ (P1 	 P2) + (P2 	 P1) ]]Γ
(d1, ?) + (F, ?)
= {|From the definition of + |}
(d1 ∨ F, ?∨?)
= {|From the truth tables |}
(d1, ?)
∈ {Indeterminate(PD), Indeterminate(D)}
• [[ P1 ]]Γ = Permit = (T, d1) and [[ P2 ]]Γ = Indeterminate = (?, d2) where {d1, d2} ⊆
{F, ?} (The result will be the same for the symmetric case). It follows that:
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[[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ|}
(T 	 (d2∨?), d1 	 (d2∨?))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(T	?, d1	?)
= {|From the truth tables |}
(?, d1)
[[ P2 	 P1 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P2 	 P1 ]]Γ|}
(?	 (T ∨ d1), d2 	 (T ∨ d1))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(?	 T, d2 	 T ))
= {|From the truth tables since d2 ∈ {F, ?}|}
(?, d2)
⇒ [[ (P1 	 P2) + (P2 	 P1) ]]Γ
(?, d1) + (?, d2)
= {|From the definition of + |}
(?∨?, d1 ∨ d2)
= {|From the truth tables |}
(?, d1 ∨ d2)
∈ {Indeterminate(PD), Indeterminate(D)}
• [[ P1 ]]Γ = Permit = (T, d1) and [[ P2 ]]Γ = Indeterminate(D) = (F, ?) where d1 ∈
{F, ?} (The result will be the same for the symmetric case). It follows that:
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[[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P1 	 P2 ]]Γ|}
(T 	 (F∨?), d1 	 (F∨?))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(T	?, d1	?)
= {|From the truth tables |}
(?, d1)
[[ P2 	 P1 ]]Γ
= {| Definition of [[ P2 	 P1 ]]Γ|}
(F 	 (T ∨ d1), ?	 (T ∨ d1))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(F 	 T, ?	 T ))
= {|From the truth tables |}
(F, ?)
⇒ [[ (P1 	 P2) + (P2 	 P1) ]]Γ
(?, d1) + (F, ?)
= {|From the definition of + |}
(? ∨ F, ? ∨ d1)
= {|From the truth tables |}
(?, ?)
= Indeterminate(PD)
7.5. Deny-unless-permit
Deny-unless-permit between P1, . . . , Pn is formalized in SePL as follows: denoted
DUP (P1, . . . , Pn) ≈ p(P1T. . . TPn)
.
According to the XACML specification [27], we have:
The “Deny-unless-permit” combining algorithm is intended for those cases where a permit
decision should have priority over a deny decision, and an “Indeterminate” or “NotApplicable”
must never be the result. It is particularly useful at the top level in a policy structure to ensure that
a PDP will always return a definite “Permit” or “Deny” result. This algorithm has the following
behavior.
1. If any decision is “Permit”, the result is “Permit”.
2. Otherwise, the result is “Deny”.
1. Suppose that P = P1T. . . TPn and it exists i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that [[ Pi ]]Γ = Permit.
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From the definition of Permit-override, wee have that [[ P ]]Γ = Permit = (T, d1) where
d1 ∈ {F, ?}. It follows, from the definition of p, that [[ pP ]]Γ == (T, F )
[[ pP.0 ]]Γ
= {|From the definition of [[ P.Q ]]|}
(T ∨ (F − T ), F ∨ (T − T )))
= {|From the truth Table |}
(T, F ∨ (T ∧ ¬T )))
= {|From the truth Table |}
(T, F ))
= {|Definition of Permit |}
Permit
2. Suppose that P = P1T. . . TPn and for all i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have [[ Pi ]]Γ 6= Permit.
From the definition of Permit-override, we have [[ P ]]Γ ∈
{(?, ?), (?, F ), (F, ?), (F, F ), (F, T )} . It follows that for the definition of p that
[[ pP ]]Γ ∈ {(F, F ), (F, T )}, i.e [[ pP ]]Γ = (F, d) where d ∈ {F, T}
[[ pP.0 ]]Γ
= {|From the definition of [[ P.Q ]]|}
(F ∨ (F − d), d ∨ (T − F )))
= {|From the truth Table |}
(F, d ∨ T )
= {|From the truth Table |}
(F, T ))
= {|Definition of Deny |}
Deny
7.6. Permit-unless-deny
Permit-unless-deny between P1, . . . , Pn is formalized in SePL as follows:
DUP (P1, . . . , Pn) ≈ p(P1U . . .UPn).1
According to the XACML specification [27], we have:
The “Permit-unless-deny” combining algorithm is intended for those cases where a deny de-
cision should have priority over a permit decision, and an “Indeterminate” or “NotApplicable”
must never be the result. It is particularly useful at the top level in a policy structure to ensure that
a PDP will always return a definite “Permit” or “Deny” result. This algorithm has the following
behavior.
1. If any decision is “Deny”, the result is “Deny”.
2. Otherwise, the result is “Permit”.
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1. Suppose that P = P1U . . .UPn and it exists i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that [[ Pi ]]Γ = Deny.
From the definition of Deny-override, wee have that [[ P ]]Γ = Deny = (d1,T) where
d1 ∈ {F, ?}. It follows, from the definition of pthat [[ pP ]]Γ = (F,T)
[[ pP.1 ]]Γ
= {|From the definition of [[ P.Q ]]|}
(F ∨ (T − T ), T ∨ (F − F )))
= {|From the truth Table |}
(F, T )
= {|Definition of Deny |}
Deny
2. Suppose that P = P1U . . .UPn and for all i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have [[ Pi ]]Γ 6= Deny.
From the definition of Permit-override, wee have that [[ P ]]Γ ∈
{(?, ?), (?, F ), (F, ?), (F, F ), (T, F )} . It follows that for the definition of p that
[[ pP ]]Γ ∈ {(F, F ), (T, F )}, i.e [[ pP ]]Γ = (a, F ) where a ∈ {F, T}
[[ pP.0 ]]Γ
= {|From the definition of [[ P.Q ]]|}
(a ∨ (T − F ), F ∨ (F − d)))
= {|From the truth Table |}
(a ∨ T, F )
= {|From the truth Table |}
(T, F ))
= {|Definition of Permit |}
Permit
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